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1 Introduction
Private returns to knowledge production have been shown to fall short of its social returns in the
pioneering work of Arrow (1962). Inappropriability of innovation outputs and technology spillovers reduce
the private sector’s incentives to engage in the socially optimal level of innovative activity. Due to the
public good nature of research and development (R&D) investments, governments have been actively
supporting R&D performed by businesses.
This paper uses a difference-in-differences approach to investigate the effects of tax incentives for
R&D, using the micro level Business Enterprise Research and Development (BERD) data for the UK.
Differently from other papers in this literature, this study exploits a clear cut discontinuity in the design of
the schemes in order to identify the policy impact. A difference-in-differences approach has been possible
thanks to the step by step implementation of the tax incentive scheme in the UK. A pound foregone in
corporate tax revenues is found to generate 3.85 pounds in additional R&D by medium sized companies.
The tax incentives are found to have prevented a downward trend in R&D spending. Despite this paper’s
focus on the UK case, the implications are general for tax incentives and R&D policy.
The Government of the United Kingdom (UK) is expanding its support to R&D activity by businesses.
The 2011 Budget Document introduced the much debated ‘Patent Box’ policy, which grants a ‘reduced
10 percent rate of corporate tax for profits arising from patents, effective from April 2013’1. In the same
document, the Government proposed an enhancement to the small and medium enterprise (SME) tax
incentives. The SME scheme started in 2000 with a rate of relief amounting to 150 percent of eligible
expenses. In 2008, this rate was raised to 175 percent, and increased further to 200 percent in 2011 and
225 percent in 2012. A prominent question now is whether the impact is high enough for these enhanced
tax incentives to generate the desired level of R&D expenditures by the private sector.
Medium sized firms are an important engine for innovative activity. Measuring SMEs’ contribution
to R&D is difficult, as reporting of formal R&D in published accounts is only compulsory for larger
corporations. However, the entrepreneurship and innovation literature documents the role played by
SMEs in aggregate innovative activity, emphasizing the importance of small businesses in the forward
leap of the United States (US) in innovation towards the end of the twentieth century (Acs and Audretsch
(1993)). The data used in this study enables that the effect of an R&D tax incentive on medium sized
firms be identified.
The UK scheme is particularly suitable for the difference-in-differences design to analyze medium
sized firms, thanks to the timing differences in the introduction of tax incentives first for SMEs and then
for large companies. This allows the examination of the effect on firms that were marginally above the
1Treasury (2011); p.56, Article 2.71
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size threshold for eligibility to the SME scheme, as they start benefiting from R&D tax incentives only
in 2002, exactly two years after the introduction of the SME tax incentive scheme. Firms that were
marginally below the size threshold for eligibility to the SME scheme then constitute the control group
for this study. The treatment and control groups are limited to medium sized companies to maintain
comparability between the two groups.
In most policy implementations, the announcement of the scheme before implementation may cause
changes in the behavior of affected agents. With investment tax breaks, it can be expected that firms
may delay their investment spending for a few periods until the introduction of the policy to attain the
maximum possible benefit from the pre-announced incentive schemes. In the estimation stage, this paper
explores the possibility of firms delaying their R&D spending strategically to increase the benefit from
the policy.
The next section presents some aggregate trends in the R&D performance of UK businesses, followed
by a summary of relevant events that took place in the run up to the introduction of R&D tax breaks and
a description of the tax incentive schemes in the UK. It then outlines the theoretical background, while
reviewing the existing literature on evaluating R&D tax incentive schemes. The third section describes
the data, the fourth section presents the estimation procedure and robustness checks and the final section
concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Trends in the R&D intensity of the UK private sector
The OECD Frascati Manual (OECD (2002)) sets out clear guidelines for defining research, develop-
ment, R&D personnel, R&D capital goods, facilities, and other related terminology. The main expenditure
items for R&D activities are:
- Current expenditures: labor, materials, supplies and ‘other’;
- Capital expenditures: land, buildings, instruments, equipment and software.
The main sectors which fund R&D activities are: (i) business enterprise2, (ii) government, (iii) private
non-profit, (iv) higher education, (v) abroad. Having obtained the funding from these sources, public or
2In the Frascati Manual, ‘Business enterprise’ is defined as ‘all firms, organizations and institutions
whose primary activity is the market production of goods or services (other than higher education) for sale
to the general public at an economically significant price’ and ‘the private non-profit institutions mainly
serving them (p.54)’. For the private non-profit institutions, their allocation to the business enterprise
sector as opposed to the private non-profit sector depends on how they are administered and financed.
The decision mechanism for such institutions can be found in the Manual (p.55).
2
private sector institutions then ‘perform’ R&D. Therefore, ‘funding’ and ‘performance’ of R&D need not
take place under one roof. Our main focus here is the business enterprise sector expenditures on research
and development (BERD), which corresponds to the R&D performed by the private sector.
R&D intensity measures the ratio of R&D expenditures to an output measure, which can be the
gross domestic product in the macro context. In the past several decades, the UK private sector’s R&D
investment performance has been sluggish both in absolute terms and in terms of BERD intensity with
respect to comparators such as the United States, Germany, France and Japan.
Figure 1: Total BERD intensity, UK and comparators
Source: OECD
The OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) and Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Develop-
ment (ANBERD) Databases report cross country time series data on R&D expenditure volumes and
provide a sectoral breakdown. Using these figures, cross country comparisons of R&D intensities can be
obtained, as in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows that total BERD as a share of value added has been lower in
the UK than in Japan, Germany, France and the USA over the period 1990-2008. Earlier studies (see, for
instance, Van Reenen (1997), Griffith and Harrison (2003)) have shown that this relative decline of UK
BERD intensity has been continuing for several decades. At this aggregate level, the introduction of tax
credits for R&D spending in the UK in 2000 and 2002 appears to have had little impact.
Despite the poor relative performance in overall BERD intensity, the UK manufacturing sector BERD
as a share of manufacturing sector value added, in contrast, has shown a steady increase and a tendency
toward catching up with its peers. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows that the UK manufacturing
sector BERD intensity has been rising over the most recent decade for which this data is available and
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since the UK R&D tax credits were introduced. In 2000s, as the UK manufacturing sector BERD intensity
experienced a rise, so did its competitors’; France, Japan and the US all experienced steep rises, with only
Germany demonstrating a rather horizontal trend. In an earlier paper, we noted that these peer trends
in neighboring countries may have been a significant factor in driving the rise in the UK manufacturing
sector R&D intensity, but even controlling for these effects, the UK experienced a steeper rise starting
around the time of introduction of the R&D tax incentives (Bond and Guceri (2012)).
Figure 2: Manufacturing sector BERD intensity, UK and comparators
Source: OECD
In general, BERD performed by the services sector as a share of this sector’s value added is much
lower than that of manufacturing. The share of manufacturing sectors in total UK value added dropped
from 26 percent in 1980 to 13 percent in 2007, while the share of service sectors has risen from 56 percent
to 76 percent. It is therefore reasonable to argue that the compositional shift in the UK economy towards
service sectors is among the primary reasons for the declining overall BERD intensity in the UK.
Within manufacturing sub-sectors, there are large heterogeneities in trends of R&D intensity, which
can be observed in Figure 3 for broad technology groups3. The UK high technology sectors have experi-
enced a steep rise in R&D intensity starting in 1997, while R&D intensity in medium technology sectors
did not demonstrate similar trends over the same period. If we magnify the neighborhood of medium
high and medium low technology sectors, as in the right hand side panel of Figure 3, it can be observed
3A technology classification is available by the OECD, where the groups are identified as high technol-
ogy, medium high technology, medium low technology and low technology sectors. The latest version of
the classification is explained in the OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Scoreboard for 2003 and
it is based on three indicators for technology and R&D intensity, averaged over ten large OECD countries.
4
that the increasing trend starting in late 1990s is much more mild for these sectors, with small drops in
R&D intensity in some of the years. It is therefore fair to argue that the increasing trend in the UK
manufacturing sector R&D intensity was driven mostly by the high technology sectors.
From the point of view of the neoclassical theory of investment, there does not seem to be an obvious
reason for different sectors to be affected differently by the implementation of a tax incentive scheme for
R&D. In Section 2.3, we discuss these theoretical underpinnings and in the empirical analysis, conduct
checks to examine whether there is significant sectoral heterogeneity in firms’ response to the R&D tax
incentives at the micro level.
Figure 3: BERD intensity of technology groups
Source: OECD
Higher technology sub-sectors of manufacturing have been growing both in their total R&D spending
and also in terms of value added (Figure 4). While the total value added and R&D intensity of higher
technology industries have been increasing, the number of such enterprises and their total employment
have been falling4. Such reallocation within manufacturing towards higher technology sub-sectors is com-
monly observed in developed economies. One explanation to this shift is discussed in the empirical trade
literature, which finds that import competition drives productivity higher in lower technology import-
competing sectors while moving the focus of local manufacturing towards more high technology sectors.
Such movements may explain the steeper rise in R&D intensity of UK manufacturing after 1997 (See,
among others, Pavcnik (2002) and Bloom et al. (2011)).
4Source: OECD and Business Structure Database over 1998-2007 made available through the Secure
Data Service.
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Figure 4: Total value added in constant (2000) prices by manufacturing sub-sectors
Source: OECD
2.2 The UK R&D tax incentive scheme
The term ‘R&D tax credit’ is often used to refer to the general class of fiscal incentives which al-
low a special treatment of R&D expenditure for tax purposes, encompassing a range of tax incentives
for both current and capital expenditures: tax credits, cash credits, enhanced deductions, special depre-
ciation allowance terms, enhanced loss carrybacks and carryforwards, to list a few. The treatment of
R&D expenditure is different for economic, accounting and tax purposes. From an economic perspective,
R&D is a type of investment; its main objective is to generate higher revenues in the future. From an
accounting perspective, on the other hand, the majority of R&D is treated as current expenditure and
such expenditure is 100 percent deducted against current revenue in the calculation of profits each period.
If there are no special tax incentives, the tax treatment is broadly in line with the accounting treatment
and most of the expenditure on R&D is expensed in the computation of taxable income. For the small
part of R&D that is capitalized, firms can only deduct from their accounting profits some estimate of the
depreciation charge on the stock of R&D capital in each period. Currently in the UK, as in many other
countries, both the current and the capital expenditures on R&D are subject to a special tax treatment,
and the details of this is explained in the rest of this section.
Tax incentive schemes for R&D can be of two types: (i) incremental, where firms benefit only to
the extent that they exceed some base level of R&D that they have previously been performing5 and (ii)
volume-based, where firms enjoy benefits on all their R&D expenditure, regardless of their past level. It is
5Countries apply different rules regarding the base R&D expenditure that the firm needs to exceed.
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becoming more and more common to introduce or increase the emphasis on volume-based schemes among
industrialized countries, as these are simpler and can reach a larger group of beneficiaries.
The UK R&D Tax Relief for Corporation Tax is relatively generous in the sense that both the SME and
the large company schemes are volume-based in the form of an enhanced deduction of qualifying current
expenditures from taxable income, and the enhanced deductions do not apply to capital expenditures.
France had an incremental tax credit until 2008, and then switched to a volume-based credit, greatly
simplifying the design of the preceding policy. The US provides an incremental tax credit with a 20-year
carryforward option, which is a longer time period than that allowed in most countries. Canada provides a
volume-based credit, and both Canada and the US also provide sub-national tax credits (See, for instance,
Wilson (2009) for a discussion of sub-national tax credits).
Discussions on a more favorable tax treatment of R&D in the UK began in the late 1990s and more
detailed consultations followed in the subsequent years. This was at least partly in response to the
declining trend in the R&D intensity of the UK economy overall, which was already at levels below those
of comparators such as France, Japan and Germany as demonstrated in Figure 1. Before 2000, when the
first significant tax breaks were introduced, all of current expenditure on R&D was 100 percent deductible
against taxable income and a subset of capital expenditures could be expensed under the Research and
Development Allowance6.
The UK R&D Tax Relief for Corporation Tax was introduced in two stages. First, the SME scheme
was implemented in April 2000 and then later in 2002, the large company scheme was introduced. The
SME scheme was a combination of an enhanced deduction and cash credits, with the former applying
to companies with positive taxable profits and the latter to those companies which incurred a tax loss
in the reference period. The SME scheme applied to companies which satisfied the SME definition of
the EC Regulation 1996/280/EC and allowed these firms to deduct, for every £100 of qualifying R&D
expenditure, £150 from their taxable income7. These companies could claim up to 24 percent of their
R&D expenditure in cash if they did not have taxable profit. The large company scheme was, in a sense,
less generous: it allowed the companies that were above the SME threshold to deduct, for every £100
expenditure, £125 against taxable income and did not grant any cash credits.
The enhanced deduction rates were subsequently increased from 1 April 2008 onwards, and this was
followed by a change in thresholds for defining an ‘SME’ for tax credit purposes8. The firm size thresholds
before and after the policy change are shown in Figure 5. These changes were announced in the 2006
6Formerly known as the ‘Scientific Research Allowance’. These capital allowances are still available.
7SME definitions are explained in detail later.
8The size definition change took place on 1 August 2008, in line with the Corporation Tax Act
(CTA09/Ss1119 - 1121)
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Budget. To reduce the risk of capturing changes to R&D following from this announcement, the empirical
analysis in this study uses data up to and including calendar year 2006 but not later.
According to the EU regulations, the SME definition consists of size thresholds and also provisions of
owner-subsidiary relationships9. This implies that small firms which are subsidiaries of large companies,
which own stakes over and above 25 percent in the firm, cannot benefit from the SME incentive scheme.
To qualify for the SME credit, companies need to satisfy the employment criterion and then either the
balance sheet size or the turnover criteria. Figure 5 depicts the relevant size thresholds which define an
SME in terms of both pre- and post-2008 criteria.
Figure 5: Size thresholds for SME tax credit
During the period of interest for this study, eligibility for the SME tax incentive required that the
company has fewer than 250 employees, and either a balance sheet size of less than e27 million (e43
million from 2005) or turnover less than e40 million (e50 million from 2005). In addition to having
satisfied these criteria, the company should not have been owned by a group that exceeds these limits, or
the individual subsidiaries, when aggregated, should not have exceeded these thresholds. Ownership in
this context refers to more than 25 percent of the capital or voting rights.
Earlier in the paper, we alluded to the possibility that companies may anticipate the introduction
of the tax credit and hence behave strategically by delaying their expenditures on R&D until after the
implementation of the policy. Such strategic behavior might have been likely in the case of the R&D
Tax Relief, as the policy was announced well before its introduction, both for the SME scheme and the
large company scheme. Figure 6 presents the major events in relation to the implementation of the R&D
9The criteria for eligibility to the SME tax incentive scheme was determined based on the relevant EC
Regulation. Depending on the year, these were: 1996/280/EC, 2003/361/EC.
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Tax Relief, where it can be seen that the government announced its plans to introduce R&D tax breaks
in 1998, without giving much detail about the rates, conditions or their time line. March 2001 marked
the beginning of consultations for a large firm tax credit, and the announcement of the large company
scheme followed in November 2001. We will later show that despite the early announcement, there is little
evidence that larger firms delayed their R&D spending until after the policy implementation.
Figure 6: Events in the early years of the R&D Tax Relief
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2.3 An overview of the theoretical underpinnings
The theoretical background on evaluating R&D tax credit schemes is influenced by the literature
on tax incentives for physical investment, which is based on the user cost of capital as a determinant
of investment decisions, first formalized by Jorgenson (1963) and then developed by Hall and Jorgenson
(1967). In their seminal paper, Hall and Jorgenson devise a model of investment to analyze the effect of the
investment tax credits and various forms of depreciation allowances in the United States. Their model is
based on Jorgenson’s ‘Theory of Investment Behavior (1963),’ building on the neoclassical optimal capital
accumulation framework in which firms maximize their profits subject to a form of neoclassical production
function by choosing input levels. For simplicity, the model assumes that replacement investment is made
at a rate proportional to the capital stock and the investment is not irreversible. Under these assumptions,
firms then set their demand for capital input at the level where the marginal product of capital is equal
to the ‘user cost of capital’. The user cost is described as: “the shadow price or implicit rental of one
unit of capital service per period of time (Jorgenson (1963; p.249))”. Hall and Jorgenson embed taxation,
depreciation allowances and tax credit rates into the present discounted value from ‘capital services’,
equate this to the price of capital goods and find an optimal level of capital for the firm as a function
of output price, output quantity, user cost of capital and the elasticity of output with respect to capital.
Both their theoretical finding and the empirical analysis point to a significant positive impact of tax
credits and depreciation allowance schemes on the firm’s capital intensity.
Following Griliches (1979), ‘R&D capital stock’ or ‘knowledge stock’ can be considered analogously to
the stock of physical capital. The main difference lies in the empirical result, as dynamic models often find
longer adjustment periods in the context of R&D investment, which may be due to for instance training
requirements for staff upon acquisition of new computer software, setting up advancements in equipment
and adaptation of newly hired R&D personnel.
Summarizing this theoretical framework in simplified terms helps in demonstrating the relationship
between tax incentives and R&D. Firms acquire knowledge stock (R&D capital) to maximize profits
subject to the law of motion of R&D capital. The first order condition equates the marginal product of
(R&D) capital to its user cost and the marginal product of the variable input to its real price. Assuming
a Cobb Douglas production function, the cost of knowledge capital is then inversely related to the optimal
level of (R&D) capital10:
C∗ = α
Q
U
(1)
where Q is the output level, α is the elasticity of output with respect to knowledge stock and U is the
10See Jorgenson et al. (1965), Jorgenson (1963) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967) for a formal discussion.
The results generalize to other constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions.
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user cost of capital11. Taking logs and rearranging:
lnC − lnQ = constant− lnU (2)
The user cost of knowledge capital must equal the before tax present value of a unit of investment in
R&D so that the marginal project breaks even. A standard expression for the user cost of R&D capital
can be derived as in Bloom et al. (1997):
U =
1−A
1− τ [r + δ] (3)
where τ is the statutory tax rate and r is the discount rate. A represents the net present value of all
current and future depreciation allowances and tax credits applicable to the marginal R&D investment, so
they are reductions in the cost of making a unit investment in R&D. The form of A depends on the design
of the tax incentive system. When there is 100 percent expensing of R&D expenditure and no special
tax credits, A = τ , offsetting the effect of corporate income tax on the required rate of return. With
an additional tax credit or an enhanced deduction for more than 100 percent of the R&D expenditure,
A > τ , leading to a lower required rate of return.
Tax incentives therefore enter the R&D equation through the user cost term. The user cost, scaled
by the firm size, is directly related to the R&D investment undertaken by the firm.
This paper is influenced by the simple neoclassical model of optimal R&D presented here as a motiva-
tion for tax incentives to affect the accumulation of knowledge capital in the firm; however, there may be
other channels through which tax incentives may affect R&D spending. The quasi-experimental research
design used in this study is not reliant on any particular theoretical model, but the discussion in Section
4.3 on our implied user cost elasticity estimates relate to the framework summarized in this section.
2.4 Estimates of the impact of R&D tax credits
To date, a clear policy discontinuity as in the UK R&D Tax Relief schemes has not been exploited
in other papers in this literature. Our study identifies the policy impact by focusing on the variation
at the size threshold for eligibility to the SME scheme. Through this policy experiment, we can back
out an estimate for the user cost elasticity, given that the drop in the user cost of R&D capital in the
11In order to increase R&D capital as a share of total output, firms increase R&D investment as a share
of output. For our empirical specification, the relationship between R&D investment and R&D capital
need not be proportional, but for the purposes of the model summarized in this section, under a steady
state assumption, C can be shown to equal κ+1κ+δRit with κ denoting the growth rate of the capital stock,
δ denoting the rate of depreciation of R&D capital and Rit denoting R&D investment.
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UK induced by the introduction of the large company R&D Tax Relief was about 13 percent (Bond and
Guceri (2012)).
Bloom et al. (2002) employ the Hall-Jorgenson (1967) approach to calculate the tax-adjusted cost
of investing in R&D across a panel of nine OECD countries over nineteen years. Specifying a dynamic
model with manufacturing sector business enterprise R&D intensity as the dependent variable, they find
a negative long run elasticity with respect to the user cost of R&D, with a value close to minus one.
In their paper, Bond and Guceri (2012) use publicly available macro level data to first calculate the
reduction in the user cost of R&D induced by the scheme, then compare the evolution of manufacturing
sector BERD intensity with predictions based on the model estimated by Bloom et al. (2002). They find
that the increase in R&D in response to the introduction of the tax credit has been around 13 percent,
in line with the Bloom et al. prediction, but with quicker adjustment to the long run equilibrium.
An evaluation of the Dutch R&D tax incentive scheme is carried out by Lokshin and Mohnen (2012),
who work with an unbalanced panel data set covering the period 1996-2004. They assume a CES produc-
tion function (as conventional in the literature) and a constant price elasticity of demand. They present
three different empirical models to estimate the user cost elasticity of R&D stock: (i) a static model
with no adjustment dynamics, (ii) a partial adjustment model (following Nadiri and Rosen (1969)), (iii)
an error correction model. Their findings, which are consistent across the models, point to a significant
negative long run elasticity of R&D stock with respect to its user cost in the range 0.54-0.79 in absolute
value, with a relatively fast convergence of about 2-3 years. Mairesse and Mulkay (2011) study the R&D
tax incentive scheme in France, which has gradually moved from an incremental scheme over the period
2004-2008, to a fully volume based scheme in 2008, increasing the budgetary cost of the program threefold.
Their study has two components: the first component analyzes the effect of the user cost reduction over
the period 2000-2007, and the second component simulates the projected evolution of R&D starting in
2008. In the first part, they find an elasticity of R&D with respect to its user cost around -0.4. The
simulations indicate a large increase in R&D, but a slow adjustment to the new long run equilibrium.
Harris et al. (2009) estimate the impact for Northern Ireland and find a long run user cost elasticity of
-1.36.
Czarnitzki et al. (2011) use the nonparametric matching approach, exploring the effect of the Canadian
Federal and Provincial R&D tax credits on a set of outcome variables, such as the share of innovative
products in sales, ‘new-to-the-world’ innovations and some proxies for the impact of the innovation on the
firm. They find significant positive effects of the tax credits on the number of new products and their sales,
while they do not find any effect on the firm’s profitability or market share. Corchuelo and Martinez-Ros
(2009) evaluate the effects of the tax incentive scheme for R&D in Spain, also using a nonparametric
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matching estimator and propensity score matching, finding that the tax incentives have a positive and
significant effect on R&D for large firms.
Our study focuses on the medium sized firms around the size threshold for eligibility to the SME
scheme, and finds that the treated firms increased their R&D spending by about 18 percent in response
to the policy intervention. After the introduction of the large company tax incentive scheme, the gap
between treatment and control group R&D spending has widened (Figure 10). This is indicative of the
tax incentive having helped to counter a decreasing trend in R&D investment by firms that remained
above the size threshold for eligibility to the SME tax incentive scheme. For medium sized firms, the
policy is found to have generated an additional £3.85 in R&D for every pound foregone in corporate tax
revenues.
Where the data is available, measuring innovation outputs is beneficial to overcome concerns about
relabeling and inflated salaries for scientists and researchers. Goolsbee (1998) and Rogers (2010) warn
that with the introduction of tax incentives, the majority of increased R&D expenditures may go to
higher salaries for scientists and engineers, rather than to a larger number of researchers. Goolsbee
(1998) documents this finding by demonstrating that there is a relatively stable supply of scientists,
with expenditure on pay rising significantly following increases in government subsidies to support R&D
expenditure by firms. For subnational credits, another concern is the geographical shift of R&D activity
away from high tax jurisdictions to those states with a more generous tax treatment of R&D (Wilson
(2009)), essentially resulting in a zero sum game. Wilson finds a long run elasticity of R&D with respect
to its user cost around -2.5, but this is offset by an out-of-state user cost elasticity of around +2.5.
Many studies underline the issue of relabeling ordinary expenses as R&D but the extent of the
problem has rarely been quantified. Evidence on relabeling is provided in an early report by the US
General Accounting Office (GAO (1989)). In their study based on the financial reports of 800 large US
corporations, US GAO finds that around 20 percent of revenue agents are not convinced by the clarity of
the definition of qualifying expenses. A more recent US GAO study dated November 2009 (GAO (2009))
lays out the main expenditure items which are more difficult to monitor for the tax authority. On the top
of their list is the proportion of salaries paid to management level staff who supervise research activities.
The report is based on interviews with the parties involved in the accounting of R&D for tax purposes,
namely, officials from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), taxpayers and tax consultants, and identifies
large differences between the opinions of all involved parties regarding the identification of qualifying
expenses. While relabeling is an important obstacle in identifying the true effect of R&D tax incentives,
there are now high penalties for misreporting in the United States and other developed countries, and tax
authorities have advanced their practice of monitoring eligible expenses over the years of implementation.
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In the 2009 GAO report, it is argued that IRS is very stringent in determining the share of qualifying
research expenditure especially for the salaries of management level staff.
3 Data
3.1 Available data sources
In the UK, only a limited group of companies and the firms above a certain size threshold are required
to disclose R&D expenditure in company accounts12. As a result, data on R&D expenditures by smaller
enterprises is rather scarce. A list of data sources for UK R&D is presented in Table 1 below, which is
reproduced from Office for National Statistics (ONS) Guidance Notes dated 13 November 2012 (Steer
(2012)).
Table 1: Data sources for R&D in the UK
Dataset Source Definition of R&D
Business Enterprise R&D (BERD) Survey Frascati Manual
Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD) Survey Frascati Manual
Northern Ireland GERD Survey Frascati Manual
Defence Statistics Survey Frascati Manual
R&D Tax Relief and Credit Administrative Other
R&D Scoreboard Administrative Other
Source: Office for National Statistics (Steer (2012)), own contribution
As can be seen in the table, there are only a handful of data sources on R&D available at the firm
level. Out of these resources, only the R&D Scoreboard data published by the Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills is in public domain, and this provides information only on the largest spenders on
R&D13. To conduct an analysis of the firms around the size threshold of interest for us, the only data sets
available are the BERD data by the ONS and the administrative data on R&D Tax Relief by the HMRC.
Only the ONS data set goes back long enough in time for us to exploit the discontinuity in 2002 which is
12SSAP 13 provides guidance on the accounting rules for research and development. Paragraphs 19 and
20 of this document explain the rules for disclosure of R&D expenditure in the profit and loss accounts
of the firm. Disclosure is limited to: “...public limited companies, or special category companies, or
subsidiaries of such companies, or which exceed by a multiple of 10 the criteria for defining a medium
sized company under the Companies Act 1985. (Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No.13,
Revised January 1989)”
13Department for Business, Innovation and Skills announced in 2012 that the collection of R&D Score-
board data was discontinued.
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the introduction of the large company scheme14.
The Business Enterprise Research and Development (BERD) survey is conducted by the ONS, with
the purpose of collecting the aggregate and sectoral UK BERD statistics. Recently, the micro level BERD
data has been available under secure conditions for approved research projects.
ONS follows the Frascati Manual (OECD (2002)) methodology to collect the statistics on Business
Enterprise Research and Development. The sampling frame for this data uses the Annual Business Survey
(ABS) as its major source to identify R&D performing firms that employ more than 50 employees. Other
main data sources include the UK Innovation Survey, new R&D sector firms from the Business Register,
information from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), International Trade in Services
R&D Exporters data and HMRC data on firms which claim R&D tax credits.
The micro level BERD data set can be merged with other ONS data sets such as the Annual Re-
spondents’ Database (ARD 1973-2009; previously, the Census of Production) and the Business Structure
Database (BSD 1997-2011; snapshot of the Business Register) to obtain a match with the firm-level char-
acteristics used as controls in this study. Because employment and turnover growth rate control variables
are sourced by the Business Structure Database, the first year in the merged data set needed to be 1998.
These data sets are available in different statistical units. BSD is provided at the ‘enterprise level’ which
is the smallest autonomous unit in a firm with own decision-making capability. BERD and ARD data
are collected at the ‘reporting unit’ level, which is where the postal address of the firm is registered. The
reporting unit is smaller than an enterprise, but the majority of the enterprises are made up of only a
single reporting unit. An enterprise group encompasses one or more enterprises, all legally connected to
each other. The analyses in this paper are carried out at the enterprise level. These units are explained
in more detail in Appendix A.1, which also explains the data cleaning procedures. The clean merged data
set is available for the period 1998-200815.
ONS uses stratified sampling to select the enterprises which will receive a BERD questionnaire form
each year. There are two types of BERD questionnaires, namely, the long form and the short form
questionnaires. A long form questionnaire is sent each year to around 400 largest spenders in R&D,
and this form asks for detailed information about the breakdown of the respondent’s R&D spending into
different categories. For the remaining reporting units, a stratified sampling procedure is used to select
the ones that will receive a short questionnaire form, which includes a summary set of questions, such as
total R&D spending (in-house and contract R&D) and R&D employment (See Appendix A.2 for further
14In a separate project we examine results from a later reform using the administrative data and make
comparisons, but this is not possible for the 2002 reform.
15The datasets used in this study were made available by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and
the Secure Data Service (SDS).
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detail).
The micro BERD data set contains all the reporting unit-year observations that were identified by the
ONS as performing R&D in a given year. The observations that are left outside of the stratified sampling
have imputed values for the questions that are not answered, using the mean values of the variable as
a share of employment in the size band-sector cell. To avoid introducing measurement error, we refrain
from using these imputed values. Details on the severity of the measurement error caused by the imputed
values are presented in Appendix A.2. For enterprises with multiple reporting units, only those that have
all associated reporting units with non-imputed values have been kept.
BSD contains the most complete information on employment, turnover, enterprise groups (ownership
data), sector and other firm characteristics that are sourced by the Inter-Departmental Business Register
(IDBR) and it is available at the enterprise level only. In the IDBR and hence the BSD, observations on
enterprises are constructed using the data from HMRC on VAT traders and PAYE employers.
3.2 Selection of treatment and control groups
We selected treatment and control groups based on the threshold for eligibility to the SME Tax Relief.
In the period of introduction of the large company scheme (2002), eligible SMEs which were already
benefiting from the SME Tax Relief are assigned to the control group, which consists of enterprises just
below the SME size threshold. This means enterprises that have between 100 and 249 employees, and
are not owned by a group that has more than 249 employees or, when aggregated, the total number
of employees in group member enterprises do not add up to more than 249. The treatment group is
composed of enterprises just above the SME employment size threshold; with employment between 250
and 400, which may or may not be owned by a larger group. The interval of 100-400 employees is chosen
specifically because it constitutes a size band used by ONS in their stratified sampling procedure, which
determines the enterprises that will receive a questionnaire form in a given year (See Appendix A.2). In
the 100-400 size band, enterprises are sampled at a ratio of 1:3, and this helps us in maintaining a roughly
similar number of enterprises in each of the treatment and control groups.
For firms’ eligibility to the SME tax credit, which places them to the control group, there are two more
criteria that are not used here. If the firm has fewer than 250 employees (in aggregate), then it is subject
to the asset/turnover test. According to the EC recommendation applicable to this incentive scheme, the
size threshold to define an SME is for the enterprise to have fewer than 250 employees AND either less
than 40 million Euros of turnover OR less than 27 million Euros of balance sheet size. The enterprise
should also not be linked to a larger enterprise which does not possess these properties which define an
SME. The reason for not undertaking the asset and turnover tests is because there is no data available on
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assets or group level turnover. Regarding the turnover criterion, simply summing the enterprise turnover
values to obtain the enterprise group level turnover is not a valid method of calculating consolidated group
level turnover. Nevertheless, the results are verified with a robustness check that defines the treatment
group using both the employment and this approximation to the turnover criteria16.
Defining the treatment group based solely on the employment measure only affects the composition
of the control group, and allows all observations in the treatment group to be those classified as large
enterprises by the EC recommendation. The control group however may contain some treated firms, since
having a total of fewer than 250 employees does not guarantee SME status, if the enterprise fails both
the asset and the turnover tests. This limitation does not jeopardize identification, but it reduces power
while testing the null hypothesis of no effect of the tax incentive in the specifications presented later.
The reporting period for BERD is the calendar year. If the reporting unit does not have the record
covering the calendar year, for instance year t, then the record for a business year that ends between April
6th of period t and April 5th of period t+1 is reported for the expenditure in year t. The Large Company
Tax Relief was introduced in April 2002, which is three months into calendar year 2002 but earlier than
2003. If a firm’s accounting year begins on any date later than the UK fiscal year, which runs between
April 6, 2002 and April 5, 2003, then the R&D spending which is made in 2002 after the introduction of
the R&D tax credit for large companies will be included in the company’s BERD returns for 2003. For
example, if Company A’s accounting year runs between July 1, 2002-June 30, 2003, then all the R&D
expenditure of Company A carried out between these dates would be recorded in the BERD returns for
2003. If, on the other hand, Company B’s accounting year runs between April 1, 2002-March 31, 2003,
then the R&D expenditure of Company B that was carried out between these dates would be recorded in
the BERD returns for 2002.
In the corporation tax returns, all the qualifying R&D can be used to claim tax credits in the 2002-
2003 fiscal year (depending on eligibility). If the firm’s accounting year coincides with the calendar year,
then the R&D reported for 2002 in BERD reflects exactly the expenditure incurred in 2002, and the
company may claim tax credit on three quarters of the qualifying expenditure made in 2002, as the
eligible expenditure will be apportioned for the period April 1, 2002-Dec 31, 2002.
Based on a number of company interviews and case studies, a qualitative HMRC review of the R&D
tax credit states that the take up has been low in the beginning of the scheme due to lack of awareness
by the firms (Michaelis et al. (2010)). Even for the companies that were aware of the tax credit, they
may have been inclined to delay their undertaking of R&D to the following year given the apportionment
of the tax credit in the first year of implementation, demonstrated in the example above. Based on these
16The results from these regressions are not included in the paper.
17
information, we selected calendar year 2003 as the first implementation period for analysis. It may be
argued that the inclusion of R&D spending during 2002 as part of the pre-reform period is problematic
because companies may be apportioning some of the R&D done in the 2002-2003 fiscal year to R&D
recorded in calendar year 2002. We later show in Section 4.2 that the results are not sensitive to the
removal of 2002 from the sample.
While running the regressions, the sample is further limited to observations which are identified as
‘active’ in the BSD, in the manufacturing sector, with reported R&D expenditures above £10, 000. For
eligibility to any tax relief, companies needed to spend at least £10, 000 until 2013. Table 2 presents the
number of observations that remain in the sample after all filtering.
There are two sources of information on sectors in the BERD data set: (i) sector of R&D information
returned only by long form respondents, and (ii) sector of activity sourced by the business register, which
is available for both short and long form recipients. In the size band of interest for this study, that is
the 100-400 employee size band, observations are mainly based on short form responses and therefore the
sector of R&D information is not available. To maintain consistency across short form and long form
recipients, the two digit sector of activity information in BERD is used instead of the two digit sector of
R&D activity, which is only available for the long form recipients.
There is a small subset of long form recipients which fall in the size bands of interest for this study
(fewer than 1000 enterprise-year observations) and comparisons between sector of activity and sector of
R&D for this small group is informative for verifying the association between the two different sector
variables. Regarding the broad split into manufacturing and services using the two digit sector of activity
in comparison to using the two digit sector of R&D, for more than 65 percent of the observations, the two
variables are in agreement. For the remaining observations, it is most common to observe a services sector
flag according to the sector of activity matched with a flag for manufacturing by the sector of R&D. These
firms are usually R&D labs which operate in the SIC sectors ‘scientific research and development’ and
‘computer programming, consultancy and related activities’. Robustness checks which include additional
observations on these firms confirmed the main results, which used only firms classified as manufacturing
by their sectors of activity and hence excluded these service sector firms.
Table 2: Number of observations, treatment and control groups across years
period 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
control 111 180 178 162 125 160 277 148 152
treatment 154 274 218 214 161 164 274 145 121
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A key aspect is that, due to the stratified sampling procedure, the micro BERD data covers different
enterprises in the treatment and control categories in each of these years. It is not necessarily the case
that the same enterprise is observed both before and after the reform, as a genuine panel cannot be
constructed in this stratum. Most of the observations are only observed in either the pre-treatment or
the post-treatment periods.
3.3 Variables and deflators
The main regressions reported in Tables 4 and 5 in the Results Section use real expenditures on
R&D which is obtained by deflating the nominal intramural R&D expenditure from the BERD data set
using a weighted deflator with 50 percent weight on researcher salaries and 50 percent weight on the
GDP deflator. Intramural R&D here means the in-house R&D carried out by the company by its own
employees. The researcher salaries component of the weighted deflator is taken from the Annual Survey
of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) tables on gross annual pay for science and technology professionals (Table
code 2.7a, job code 21). The GDP deflator is obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook ‘pgdp’ series
(base year 2008). In the R&D literature, this kind of weighted deflator is commonly used to reflect the
fact that around 50 percent of R&D investment goes to the salaries and wages of research staff (See, for
instance, Bloom et al. (2002)). Data on turnover and employment is obtained from the BSD. Turnover
controls (both levels and growth rates) are deflated using the manufacturing output component of the UK
producer price index series (JVZ7).
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Identification with the difference-in-differences estimator requires that in the absence of treatment,
we should expect the change in the outcome variable between pre- and post-intervention periods for
the control group to be equal to the change in the outcome variable for the treatment group. The
counterfactual for the treatment group is not observed, but the trends in other variables may indicate
if there is a large differential change between pre- and post-intervention periods for the treatment and
control groups. Reliable information on employment, turnover and sector is available thanks to the BSD.
Trends in turnover and employment can be observed in Figure 717. The levels of enterprise employment
and turnover are naturally very different for the treatment and control groups, but here the point is to
17The bottom graphs in the Figure show mean and median employment for treatment and control
groups at the enterprise level; therefore, the values may remain below the threshold level of 250 even
for the treatment group, as the determining criteria for eligibility to the SME credit considers enterprise
group employment.
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Figure 7: Comparison of treatment and control groups
see whether there is a large differential change or not, which does not seem to be the case around the
periods 2002 and 2003.
The sectoral compositions across treatment and control groups are presented in Table 3. For our
purposes, it is important to have a similar distribution of high tech, medium tech and low tech firms in
the pre- and post-intervention periods across treatment and control groups. One way of identifying this
is to use the OECD technology classifications that are laid out in OECD (2003) based on the average
R&D intensity of relevant two, three or four digit sub-sectors of activity in manufacturing. In order to
establish a classification of this kind for our sample, we use the R&D intensities of the two digit sectors
available in our own data. The correspondence between the OECD high, medium high, medium low and
low technology sectors with our classification can be observed in Table 9 in Appendix A.2. There are no
large discrepancies between the two classifications.
First, we identify each observation in the sample as ‘above’ or ‘below’ the overall median R&D
intensity. We then categorize each two-digit sector as ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’ R&D intensity, where the
‘high R&D intensity’ group has more than 65 percent of observations above the median, ‘medium R&D
intensity’ group has between 40 to 65 percent of observations above the median and ‘low R&D intenstiy’
group has fewer than 40 percent of observations above the median. Table 3 demonstrates that there is
some significant change in sectoral compositions between pre- and post-treatment periods. In Table 3, the
percentages represent the share of observations in a given cell in high, medium and low technology sectors,
where a cell can be one of the following: (i) control group pre-treatment, (ii) control group post-treatment,
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(iii) treatment group pre-treatment, and (iv) treatment group post-treatment. It can be observed in the
Table that the share of observations belonging to high technology sectors has increased in the control
group over time from 24 to 31 percent, whereas in the treatment group, there is no such increase, and
conversely the share of medium technology sectors decreased in the control group from 44 to 36 percent.
These compositional changes relate to the fact that the samples of treatment and control group enterprises
available are not genuine panels. This demonstrates the potential importance of controlling for sectors in
the estimation stage. Table 9 in Appendix A.3 provides further evidence for such changes over time at
the more detailed two-digit sector level.
Table 3: Share of observations in high, medium and low intensity of R&D sectors
R&D intensity: high medium low
control treat. control treat. control treat.
1998-2002 24% 24% 44% 42% 32% 34%
2003-2006 31% 24% 36% 39% 33% 37%
There may be several reasons underlying the increase in the share of high technology firms in the
control group. First of all, this may be a reflection of a compositional shift in the whole economy, outlined
in Section 2.1. The reallocation towards higher technology sectors of manufacturing may be taking place
more intensively at the lower end of the firm size distribution, with the smaller low productivity firms
dropping out faster than the larger ones. Alternatively, the observed sectoral shift in the control group
may merely be an artifact of the sampling procedure for the BERD data set.
The Business Structure Database (BSD) allows for a further investigation of the shift in the sectoral
composition of the UK manufacturing sector by size bands. Comparing the distribution of enterprises
across high, medium and low technology sectors for the 100-249 employee size band with that for the
250-399 employee size band is informative in finding out whether the patterns observed in the BERD
sample are a reflection of broader trends in the economy. Figure 8 demonstrates that such reallocation
effects across our size bands of interest are not very pronounced, at least for the period that can be studied
using the BSD data available.
The difference-in-differences estimator aims to capture the average or expected impact of the inter-
vention on the treatment group, that is, it aims to estimate:
{E[Y |t > 2002, D = 1]− E[Y |t ≤ 2002, D = 1]} − {E[Y |t > 2002, D = 0]− E[Y |t ≤ 2002, D = 0]} (4)
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Figure 8: Share of UK enterprises in high, medium and low technology sectors for medium
size bands
where
D =

1, if treated
0, if control
(5)
t represents the year and Y stands for the outcome of interest, in our case, it is the R&D investments
made by the sample enterprises.
The sample analogue of the expression in Equation 4 compares differences in means between pre-
and post-intervention periods across treatment and control group observations. Figure 9 presents the
mean R&D spending in each of these cells. In the subsequent analysis, we use the natural logarithm to
have a percentage change interpretation, and the shape of the graphs look similar if we use the natural
logarithm of R&D spending instead of the levels. These cell means simply correspond to the coefficients in
a diff-in-diff regression without any controls. In a regression sense, the diff-in-diff coefficient captures the
additional R&D generated thanks to the policy intervention, after having accounted for any treatment-
specific or control-specific effects as well as common trends. In the Figure, it can be observed that there
is a differential change between the two groups, mainly owing to a fall in the control group R&D between
the two periods, rather than a rise in the treatment group R&D. If the specification with no controls
were correct, then it suggests that the policy intervention may have prevented a greater decline in R&D
around the size threshold of interest for this study. The trend in the average R&D spending by control
and treatment firms are presented in Figure 10, showing the widening gap between treatment and control
group firms after the introduction of the R&D tax credit.
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Figure 9: R&D spending across treatment and control groups, pre- and post-2003
Figure 10: Comparison of treatment and control groups, mean R&D
4 Results
4.1 Model
We estimate the following base model:
rit = γ + δDDi + δTTt + δIDiTt + x
′
itβx + νit (6)
where rit is the natural logarithm of R&D spending of enterprise i in year t in 2008 prices, Di is a dummy
that takes on a value of 1 for treated observations, 0 for the control group, Tt is a dummy that takes on
a value of 1 for years 2003 onwards and 0 otherwise. The coefficient δI on the interaction term DiTt thus
captures any differential change in rit between these two periods for the treatment group compared to the
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control group, and the null hypothesis of no impact of the introduction of the tax credit for larger firms
corresponds to δI = 0. We later drop Tt and include a full set of year dummies. xit is a K × 1 vector
of controls, including sector dummies, sector-year interaction terms, employment, real turnover and their
growth rates.
Table 4 presents the results from using this specification with different choices of controls. Column 1
presents the most simple specification with no controls, which replicates (in a regression sense) the right
hand side picture in Figure 9. After the addition of each control variable, the sample size changes as some
of these variables are only available for a more limited sample. In order to trace if the results change
due to the reduced sample size or the addition of the control variable, regressions are run on the same
sample with and without the controls and the results are presented in the column beside the one with the
particular control variable(s).
The most important set of controls turns out to be the sector dummy variables. In Columns (1) and
(3), the diff-in-diff coefficient is not significantly difference from zero, but in all regressions with sector
controls, this coefficient is close to 0.2 and at least borderline significant at the 10 percent level. We saw
in Table 3 above that the composition of the control group shifts towards more high tech sectors in the
later period, and this illustrates the importance of controlling for this change.
The addition of turnover and employment variables at the same time, is our best proxy for controlling
for productivity given the available data. In Column (6) of Table 4, the addition of the turnover and
employment controls in levels induces a slight drop of the diff-in-diff coefficient from 0.23 (Column (7)) to
0.18 (Column (6)) and the t-statistic goes down from 2.0 to 1.7 as the estimate becomes more imprecise.
In Columns (8) and (9), we control for turnover and employment growth rates. Column (9) results include
both the levels and the growth rates of (the natural logarithm of) turnover and employment. The results
in Columns (8), (9) and (10) require the availability of turnover and employment information from two
periods back, and the effect of having a smaller sample size is reflected in the results in Column (10).
Without introducing any employment and turnover controls, the reduction in sample size because of the
increased data requirement in Column (10) reduces the t-statistic of the diff-in-diff coefficient to 1.85.
The magnitude of the coefficient remains at 0.21. The addition of turnover and employment growth rate
controls then induces a drop in the magnitude of the coefficient from 0.21 (Column (10)) to 0.18 (Column
(9)), and the t-statistic drops to 1.6 as the estimate becomes more imprecise. The turnover variable is very
jumpy and contains outliers, which were not removed from the sample to retain comparability across the
results, but the addition of this variable increases the variance of estimated coefficients. The 95 percent
confidence intervals for the estimates in Columns (8), (9) and (10) largely overlap.
In Table 5, this base model is then complemented by a specification which has R&D scaled by firm
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employment as the outcome of interest, with rit − lit as the dependent variable (lit denotes the natural
logarithm of employment). This specification is more in line with the theoretical background, which is
explained in Section 2.3 where it has been shown that:
lnR− lnQ = constant− lnU (7)
Since we do not have information on Q, which is the firm’s output, we can use the next best available
firm size measure, that is the total employment of the firm. Turnover is also an alternative here, but
as mentioned earlier, the turnover values exhibit high variation and do not seem to be a very reliable
benchmark. Regression results with the turnover variable as an additional control have been included in
Tables 4 and 518. The results presented in Table 5 from estimating the model with R&D scaled by the
firm size as the dependent variable are very similar to those in Table 4 in terms of both the magnitude
and the significance of the diff-in-diff coefficients.
Having established that the sector level controls are important in the results, several variations of the
model allowing for sector-specific difference-in-differences coefficients have been run. These specifications
were of interest for comparing the micro level findings for the size band studied here with the aggregate
trends discussed in Section 2.1. The null hypothesis of equal diff-in-diff coefficients for high, medium high,
medium low and low technology sectors cannot be rejected. In aggregate data, on the other hand, the
increase in R&D intensity appears to be driven by the high technology manufacturing sectors. In line
with the basic neoclassical theory of R&D investment, our results suggest that the impact of the R&D
tax credit was similar between high technology and lower technology sectors. If this is correct, it follows
that other factors caused the composition of UK BERD to shift towards high technology sectors over
this period. One explanation may be the increased competition from BRIC countries in lower technology
sub-sectors of manufacturing, as discussed in Bloom et al. (2011), which induced a rise in the intensity of
innovation in more high technology sectors in the UK. Such trends would be captured by the interactions
between year and sector dummy variables in the micro analysis. Another explanation may be that the
size band of interest for the purposes of this study (100-400 employees) is smaller than that where the
bulk of R&D is performed (larger companies) and the trends may be different than at the upper end of
the size threshold. Given that the share of UK manufacturing BERD which is conducted by the firms
in the 100-400 employee size band is about 14 percent around the time period studied, this possibility
cannot be ruled out.
18In other specifications, the coefficient on the log of employment is allowed to differ from unity. In all
cases where sector dummies are included, a significant differential effect of the tax incentive of around
17-23 percent is found in comparison to the counterfactual scenario. Since these results do not provide
new insights, the tables have not been included in the paper.
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Table 4: Results (I)
rit = γ + δDDi + δTTt + δIDiTt + x
′
itβx + νit
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
control, pre 5.496 4.998 5.399 4.972 6.234 -2.967 2.741 7.657 0.834 7.862
(70.73) (20.62) (49.65) (19.80) (6.65) (-3.36) (3.61) (3.77) (0.37) (3.82)
treated group 0.565 0.548 0.566 0.552 0.557 0.194 0.543 0.560 0.190 0.556
(5.86) (6.38) (5.85) (6.39) (6.30) (2.06) (6.10) (5.93) (1.88) (5.87)
post-reform period -0.093 -0.164
(-1.10) (-2.05)
diff-in-diff 0.115 0.224** 0.123 0.227** 0.212* 0.184* 0.228** 0.214* 0.179 0.213*
(0.94) (2.05) (1.01) (2.06) (1.89) (1.70) (2.03) (1.86) (1.61) (1.85)
ln(employment lag) 0.143 0.0585
(1.37) (0.52)
ln(real turnover lag) 0.506 0.594
(6.46) (7.77)
empl. growth (lag) 0.212 0.396
(1.97) (3.33)
turn. growth (lag) -0.028 -0.204
(-0.52) (-3.03)
sector dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
sector*year No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of obs 3218 3218 3218 3218 3218 3199 3199 2902 2902 2902
t-values in brackets below the coefficient
standard errors clustered at the enterprise level
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Table 5: Results (II)
rit − lit = γ + δDDi + δTTt + δIDiTt + x′itβx + νit
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
control, pre 0.479 -0.031 0.337 -0.0985 1.738 -4.672 -2.124 1.884 -0.928 2.082
(6.34) (-0.15) (3.23) (-0.45) (1.83) (-5.78) (-3.01) (0.92) (-0.42) (1.01)
treated group 0.097 0.086 0.097 0.088 0.094 0.007 0.078 0.095 0.025 0.091
(1.05) (1.04) (1.04) (1.06) (1.11) (0.08) (0.91) (1.04) (0.26) (0.99)
post-reform period -0.091 -0.156
(-1.08) (-1.99)
diff-in-diff 0.107 0.216** 0.117 0.219** 0.210* 0.187* 0.228** 0.214* 0.170 0.213*
(0.90) (2.05) (0.98) (2.07) (1.95) (1.76) (2.11) (1.92) (1.56) (1.91)
ln(employment lag) -0.402 -0.515
(-4.31) (-5.37)
ln(real turnover lag) 0.470 0.561
(6.30) (7.62)
empl. growth (lag) 0.206 0.383
(2.07) (3.56)
turn. growth (lag) -0.032 -0.205
(-0.66) (-3.13)
sector dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
sector*year No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of obs 3218 3218 3218 3218 3218 3199 3199 2902 2902 2902
t-values in brackets below the coefficient
standard errors clustered at the enterprise level
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4.2 Robustness checks
The results presented in the preceding section are robust to estimating the model at the reporting
unit level, using sectors of R&D rather than sectors of activity to define the manufacturing subsample
and the sector dummy variables, and using the turnover criterion in addition to employment to define the
treatment group.
Placebo tests have been run with a difference-in-differences variable for all other years available in
the data, and no effect has been found in any other year than 2003. Had the effect been driven by the
more productive firms that may be surviving in the treatment group differentially more than the control
group, we would have observed a significant difference-in-difference in other years of the analysis as well.
The main concern in a policy setting where the announcement of the policy predates implementation
is that beneficiaries may adjust their investment behavior after the announcement but prior to implemen-
tation to obtain the maximum gain from it. In the case of the R&D Tax Relief schemes in the UK, neither
the SME nor the large company scheme came as a surprise for the firms that were going to benefit.
The expected behavior of a forward-looking profit maximizing firm would be to delay some R&D
investment spending after the announcement until after the implementation of the policy, or maybe even
until the firm’s first complete tax year after the introduction of the tax credit, to avoid the apportionment
of the benefit. For example, any R&D undertaken in the period January-December 2002 would attract
only 75 percent of the credit, while R&D undertaken in January-December 2003 would attract 100 percent
of the credit. Consultations for the large company scheme were launched with the 2001 Budget, a year
prior to implementation (Figure 6). In this case one may observe a drop after the announcement but
before the introduction of the policy, and then an overshoot of R&D investment shortly after the policy
has been introduced as all the postponed investment would tend to be made in these early periods. If
this were the case, then what we observe as the difference-in-difference effect could solely have been the
reflection of postponement of R&D spending to a later date, rather than a genuine increase in R&D
spending as a result of the policy.
The simplest way of assessing whether there has been any strategic delaying is to omit all the periods
between announcement and the first period of implementation. In the context of the large company
scheme, omission of the years 2002 and 2003 achieves this objective. Table 6 reports results for the
same specifications presented in Table 4, but with observations for these two years excluded from the
sample. The estimated impact of the introduction of the tax credit for larger firms remains very similar
to that obtained using the full sample, suggesting an increase in R&D by approximately 19-22 percent.
The smaller sample size results in a marginal reduction in the statistical significance of the estimated
coefficient on the diff-in-diff interaction term, but there is no indication that our full sample results are
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seriously biased by firms postponing R&D expenditure until after the introduction of the tax credit in
April 2002. Results with R&D per worker as the dependent variable reported in Table 7 are very similar
to the finding in Table 6.
4.3 Discussion
The UK R&D tax incentive scheme has gradually become more generous, now with more than £1
billion cost to the Exchequer in foregone corporation tax revenue annually. The findings of this paper
suggest a robust 18-23 percent increase in R&D spending after the enterprises in the treatment group
became eligible for this tax incentive.
The ONS data allows us to estimate that the total R&D spending in the size band of interest for this
study (100-399 employees) in 2003 by the manufacturing sector was about £747 million. Using micro level
data on BERD, we can estimate that 68 percent of this, or £506 million, was done by the enterprises in the
treatment group (250-399 employees). If our most modest estimate of an 18 percent increase applied to
all R&D undertaken by manufacturing firms with 250-399 employees, then the additional R&D generated
for this size group would have been about £77 million in 2003 prices.
From the estimate of 18-23 percent, one can back out the elasticity of R&D with respect to its user
cost, utilizing the finding that the introduction of the large company scheme resulted in a reduction in
the user cost of R&D by about 13 percent in the UK (Bond and Guceri (2012)). The lower bound of 18
percent increase in spending therefore corresponds to a user cost elasticity estimate of about -1.35.
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Table 6: Robustness Checks (I) - 2002-2003 omitted, dep. var. real R&D (natural log)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
control, pre 5.484 2.236 5.596 4.86 6.234 -3.142 2.575 -0.428 -7.524 -0.542
(66.76) (9.10) (55.24) (15.61) (4.79) (-4.23) . (-0.36) (-4.46) (-0.44)
treated group 0.552 0.555 0.552 0.557 0.564 0.203 0.549 0.563 0.199 0.562
(5.40) (6.05) (5.39) (6.05) (5.95) (1.99) (5.76) (5.52) (1.85) (5.49)
post-reform period -0.0847 -0.13
(-0.88) (-1.44)
diff-in-diff 0.16 0.221 0.171 0.225 0.211 0.191 0.226 0.221 0.19 0.217
(1.17) (1.81) (1.25) (1.84) (1.69) (1.58) (1.80) (1.71) (1.53) (1.67)
ln(employment lag) 0.128 0.0196
(1.09) (0.15)
ln(real turnover lag) 0.511 0.618
(5.86) (7.50)
empl. growth (lag) 0.254 0.463
(2.05) (3.28)
turn. growth (lag) -0.0463 -0.231
(-0.74) (-3.21)
sector dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
sector dummies*year No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of obs 2608 2608 2608 2608 2608 2594 2594 2311 2311 2311
t-values in brackets below the coefficient
standard errors clustered at the enterprise level
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Table 7: Robustness Checks (II) - 2002-2003 omitted, dep. var. real R&D per worker (natural log)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
control, pre 0.465 -2.576 0.576 -0.207 1.857 -4.865 -2.04 -5.584 -9.486 -5.701
(5.82) (-6.72) (5.72) (-0.79) (1.41) (-7.93) . (-4.74) (-6.08) (-4.75)
treated group 0.090 0.099 0.089 0.100 0.106 0.024 0.088 0.102 0.033 0.101
(0.92) (1.12) (0.90) (1.12) (1.16) (0.25) (0.97) (1.04) (0.33) (1.03)
post-treatment period -0.0763 -0.115
(-0.81) (-1.29)
diff-in-diff 0.142 0.202 0.154 0.206 0.197 0.179 0.214 0.208 0.169 0.204
(1.06) (1.71) (1.16) (1.75) (1.64) (1.52) (1.78) (1.68) (1.39) (1.63)
ln(employment lag) -0.422 -0.553
(-4.08) (-5.27)
ln(real turnover lag) 0.475 0.591
(5.82) (7.61)
empl. growth (lag) 0.264 0.457
(2.29) (3.58)
turn. growth (lag) -0.057 -0.234
(-1.02) (-3.36)
sector dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
sector dummies*year No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of obs 2608 2608 2608 2608 2608 2594 2594 2311 2311 2311
t-values in brackets below the coefficient
standard errors clustered at the enterprise level
31
5 Conclusion
The number of countries which offer R&D tax incentives to stimulate business R&D spending has
been increasing rapidly in the past few decades. After a long period of relative decline in aggregate R&D
intensity, the UK joined the group of countries which offer generous fiscal incentives for R&D in 2000 with
the introduction of the SME Tax Relief Scheme, followed by the large company scheme in 2002. In this
study, the gap in the timings of these two policies was utilized to obtain difference-in-difference estimates
of the impact of the large firm tax credit on those large firms that are closest in size to the largest SMEs,
which were already benefiting from the SME scheme when the large company scheme was introduced.
Tax credits have a direct effect on the user cost of R&D capital, or the required rate of return from
the marginal R&D project which is just sufficient for the project to be commercially viable. Based on
the neoclassical optimal capital accumulation framework, an inverse relationship between the user cost of
R&D and the firm’s investment in R&D can be expected. Motivated by this theoretical background, the
empirical specifications in this paper examined the effects of the introduction of the large company tax
credit scheme on R&D spending and on R&D per worker at the enterprise level.
Controlling for firm size and growth using employment and turnover, more importantly, for changes
in the sectoral composition of our samples using dummy variables for two digit sectors of activity (and
their interactions with time), we found that treatment group companies which started to benefit from the
large company scheme in the 2002-03 fiscal year increased their R&D spending by around 18 percent in
comparison to the control group after the introduction of the policy. The announcement of the scheme
pre-dated implementation by about a year; therefore, we conducted robustness checks to verify that the
effect found in this study was not simply a result of the postponement of R&D spending to the period
after the introduction of the scheme.
The robust 18 percent increase over the counterfactual scenario of no tax credits for large firms
corresponds to an elasticity of R&D with respect to its user cost of around -1.35. If we assume that the
estimate of an 18 percent increase applies to all R&D undertaken by manufacturing firms with 250-399
employees, then the additional R&D generated for this size group would have been about £77 million in
2003 prices. Given that the total cost of the large company scheme to the Exchequer was £340million,
and assuming that the treated firms in our sample would be responsible for the same share of the cost as
their share in total R&D, we may argue that the firms in our treatment group was responsible for a cost
of about £20 million in foregone taxes. This then translates to the generation of an additional £3.85 in
R&D per pound foregone in taxes.
According to our findings, the UK R&D tax incentive scheme has been successful in generating a
considerable amount of additional R&D spending by the business sector. Further research may seek to
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shed light on the decomposition of this improved performance into different expenditure items such as
researcher salaries and newly hired researchers, using more detailed data.
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A Data appendix
A.1 Data cleaning
BERD data is available at the ‘reporting unit’ level, which corresponds to the geographical unit
that has the postal address of the firm. The reporting unit may or may not be larger than a ‘local unit’,
therefore it may be larger than a single plant or a single R&D lab. It may be attached to the headquarters
or can be a separate unit. A slightly larger statistical unit than the reporting unit is the ‘enterprise’, which
is defined in the EU Regulation on Statistical Units (EEC 696/93) as “...an organizational unit producing
goods or services, which benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the
allocation of its current resources...”. BERD observations have the reporting unit as their identifier and
most of them also contain the enterprise reference number. Missing values for the enterprise references in
BERD have been filled using the ARD, which contains both the reporting unit and enterprise reference
numbers. Other information in ARD has not been used due to the low overlap between the BERD and
ARD stratified sample for firms in the size range which is the main focus of this study.
An ‘enterprise group’ is defined as “an association of enterprises bound together by legal and/or
financial links. A group of enterprises can have more than one decision-making centre [...]. It constitutes an
economic entity which is empowered to make choices, particularly concerning the units which it comprises
(EEC 696/93)”. The definition of an enterprise group is important for our purposes, as assignment to
the control group depends on whether the group as a whole satisfies the criteria for eligibility to the SME
scheme.
Reporting unit level R&D data in BERD is aggregated to the enterprise level to match with BSD.
For enterprises with multiple reporting units, only those that have all associated reporting units with
non-imputed values have been kept. The procedure of removing reporting units with imputed values
reduced the sample size substantially, while the fact that all reporting units needed to be aggregated to
the enterprise level did not seriously worsen the reduction in sample size.
Similar to ARD, BERD provides information on both the reporting unit and enterprise references for
each observation, but around a total of 40,000 observations appear to be missing the enterprise reference
numbers in BERD for the years included in this study19. To remedy this problem, the ARD dataset was
used, completing a significant portion of the missing enterprise references in BERD. This was possible,
because the micro level ARD dataset with some basic information is available for all observations, even
if they are not selected for sampling in a given year. Other information in ARD than the reporting
unit-enterprise reference mapping was not used, as the sampling ratios in ARD are different from those
19By an observation, here we mean a unique reporting unit-year combination.
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in BERD for the size range of interest in this study and we did not observe sufficient overlap between
sampled observations in BERD and ARD in the relevant size range20.
In order to match the data with the business register, it was necessary to sum reporting unit values to
the enterprise level as BSD is provided at the enterprise level, which is also a more meaningful economic
unit in comparison to the reporting unit to run the analyses. Nevertheless, we later ran robustness
checks at the reporting unit level and observed that the results were not highly affected by the change
in units. Table 8 presents the number of observations left in various data cleaning steps. The number of
non-imputed observations are also presented in this Table, where it can be seen that sampled enterprises
constitute a small fraction of total enterprises which were identified as conducting R&D. Appendix A.2
provides further information about the imputed values in the BERD data set. In the Table, the number
of enterprises which only have one reporting unit, and the number of enterprise groups that only have one
enterprise are provided to give an idea about the group structures, and also the large overlap between the
reporting unit and the enterprise.
Table 8: Number of reporting units and enterprise references across years
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
All BERD, total rows 14,906 14,226 16,272 15,666 19,407 17,141 19,384 20,364 24,251
All BERD, total real responses 2,037 3,168 3,051 3,103 3,132 3,017 3,166 3,036 2,769
Unique rep unit year obs in BERD 9,197 8,544 9,515 9,506 11,896 10,334 12,783 13,874 18,018
Unique rep unit year real responses in BERD 1,369 2,384 2,344 2,472 2,483 2,519 2,641 2,529 2,252
Rep units singly attached to an enterprise 8,552 7,920 8,645 8,850 10,945 10,064 12,361 13,186 17,552
Total BERD represented by the rep units
singly attached to an enterprise
76% 80% 81% 77% 85% 80% 69% 69% 74%
Unique entref year obs in collapsed BERD 8,622 7,987 8,729 8,937 11,055 10,167 12,529 13,301 17,672
Number of entref year observations with all
non-imputed rep unit observations
1,296 2,303 2,248 2,383 2,342 2,406 2,492 2,389 2,094
Number of entref year observations with all
imputed rep unit observations
7,292 5,654 6,437 6,509 8,646 7,702 9,978 10,853 15,516
Number of entref year observations with
some imputed rep unit observations there-
fore needed to be dropped
34 30 44 45 67 59 59 59 62
Number of entref year observations with all
non-imputed rep unit observations-all un-
matched entrefs to BSD
1,232 2,239 2,186 2,300 2,268 2,317 2,440 2,279 2,060
Unmatched to BSD 64 64 62 83 74 89 52 110 34
Number of enterprise groups in the resulting
data set
1,059 1,949 1,975 2,127 2,114 2,178 2,244 2,164 1,944
Enterprises singly attached to an enterprise
group
972 1,797 1,846 2,014 2,008 2,080 2,118 2,089 1,861
Number of groups with more than a single
enterprise
87 152 129 113 106 98 126 75 83
Total BERD represented by enterprises
singly attached to an enterprise group
(within this ’non-imputed, BSD-matched’
data set
59% 44% 54% 69% 67% 74% 80% 86% 77%
Filter further to, real R&D>£10K and non-
missing; number of enterprises
1,188 2,095 2,041 2,152 2,163 2,192 2,316 2,162 1,965
Filter further to real R&D>£10K and non-
missing, active, employment size band 100-
400; number of enterprises
347 598 523 517 442 472 730 485 448
Filter further to real R&D>£10K and non-
missing, active, employment size band 100-
400 and manufacturing; number of enter-
prises
265 454 396 376 286 324 551 293 273
20ARD contains important information such as gross value added and other variables from the Annual
Business Inquiry.
35
A.2 Imputed values in BERD
For the analyses in this paper, the BERD data set has some drawbacks, which arise from its sampling
procedures. There are two types of questionnaire forms sent out to firms: a long form and a short form.
About 400 largest spenders (those who spent more than £3 million in the given year) on R&D receive a
long form questionnaire, and the rest receive a short form questionnaire. This latter form contains a small
set of questions tracing basic information such as the unit’s: (i) in-house R&D expenditure, (ii) extramural
R&D expenditure, (iii) full time equivalent number of R&D personnel, and (iv) total headcount on R&D.
In the micro level data set, unfortunately there is no short-form based information on the number of R&D
personnel or total headcount on R&D. The long form collects a much wider set of variables, including a
breakdown of R&D expenditure to product groups; capital and current expenditure, broken down into
salaries and other current expenditure; sources of funding for R&D; a breakdown of the skills set for R&D
employment; and a breakdown of R&D expenditure into geographic locations (UK postcodes). As smaller
firms tend to spend less on R&D than larger firms, the information available on SMEs is mostly limited
to the questions asked in the short form.
The group of smaller firms (as they are less likely to be among the top 400 spenders) are subject
to sampling at different sampling fractions depending on their size measured by employment. Since the
stratified sampling procedure is repeated every year, this causes many gaps in the time series data, making
it difficult to obtain a clean panel structure with the same firm being followed across time. Based on the
publicly available BERD First Release data21, the breakdown of participants to BERD Inquiry into long
and short form recipients is around 4000 sampled firms, out of which around 400 are sent a long form
and the rest are sent a short form. Out of the firms which receive short forms, all those with more than
400 employees are sampled. In our size band of interest, which has firms with 100-400 employees, the
sampling ratio is 1:3. The smallest firms, that is, those with less than 100 employees are sampled with a
1:4 ratio.
When aggregating the data for the BERD publication, the ONS imputes the values for the unsampled
firms based on their employment number and product group. In each of the 99 product group-size band
‘cells’ available (33 product groups over 3 size bands), the values for the unsampled observations are
imputed using the average R&D per worker value of those observations which are not imputed, with
employment as the scaling variable. For instance, if an unsampled firm in sector H (Pharmaceuticals) and
size band 2 (100-400 employees) has “x” employees (this information is available through the IDBR for
all firms), their unknown in-house R&D spending is imputed as the mean R&D per worker in that cell
multiplied by the employment number “x” of the observation. This imputation procedure introduces a
21Until 2007, this publication was part of the MA14 Business Monitor.
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high level of variation across years for a given reporting unit when the micro panel version of the data set
is used. The variance of the growth rate in R&D spending from one year to the next increases significantly
between two years of data when these are imputed, and also when one of the two values is imputed. Figure
11 demonstrates the uneven distribution of changes in R&D over time when the observation moves from
an actual value to an imputed value and vice versa. The distribution of R&D growth rates is a smooth
bell shaped curve only for those observations which move from an actual value to another year’s actual
value.
Figure 11: Kernel density estimates for y-o-y real growth in R&D, size band 100-399
While aggregating from the reporting unit level to the enterprise level, it would not be consistent to
add up an imputed value with a nonimputed value, hence we only aggregate the nonimputed values for
each observation where available. For the enterprise-year observations which include an imputed value by
one of the reporting units, the whole enterprise-year observation is considered as ‘missing’.
A.3 Sector distribution of enterprises
Heterogeneities across treatment and control groups in terms of their sectoral compositions have been
discussed in Section 3.4. Table 3 demonstrated that the change in sectoral compositions over time requires
us to control for sectors in the estimation stage. More detailed evidence on this can be observed in Table
9, where the distribution of observations over two digit manufacturing sectors is presented. In the Table,
columns represent number of observations in a given sector, period (pre or post) and treatment or control
group. The percentages show the share of observations in the sector for a given cell, where a cell can be
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one of the following: (i) control group pre-treatment, (ii) control group post-treatment, (iii) treatment
group pre-treatment, and (iv) treatment group post-treatment.
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Table 9: Distribution of enterprise-year observations across two digit sectors
TREATMENT GROUP CONTROL GROUP
OECD class Own class pre %in
tot
post %in
tot
pre %in
tot
post %in
tot
Food, beverages, tobacco L L 47 5% 52 7% 31 4% 35 5%
Textiles and clothes L L 36 4% 17 2% 24 3% 13 2%
Wood, paper, publishing, printing L L 19 2% 15 2% 20 3% 23 3%
Refined petroleum ML M .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Chemicals MH M 130 13% 75 11% 91 12% 90 12%
Pharmaceuticals H H 29 3% 15 2% 11 1% 36 5%
Rubber and plastics ML L 56 5% 44 6% 29 4% 38 5%
Nonmetallic minerals ML L 29 3% 17 2% 20 3% 24 3%
Basic iron and ferro alloys ML L .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Nonferrous metals ML L 14 1% 20 3% .. .. .. ..
Fabricated metal products ML L 45 4% 23 3% 38 5% 29 4%
Machinery MH M 166 16% 114 16% 145 19% 111 15%
Office machinery and computers H H 26 3% 18 3% 18 2% 15 2%
Electrical machinery MH M 90 9% 60 9% 60 8% 44 6%
Radio, TV, communication H H 74 7% 71 10% 64 8% 93 13%
Precision instruments H H 121 12% 64 9% 90 12% 82 11%
Motor vehicles MH L 56 5% 40 6% 25 3% 32 4%
Railway, rolling stock MH M .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Shipbuilding ML L .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Aircraft, spacecraft H M 16 2% 13 2% .. .. .. ..
Furniture L L 29 3% 20 3% 33 4% 26 4%
Recycling L M .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Total 1021 704 756 737
.. represents disclosive figures. Columns add up to 100 percent including these figures.
OECD technology classes: L: low technology, ML: medium low technology, MH: medium high technology, H: high technology
Technology classes according to own sample: L: low technology, M: medium technology, H: high technology
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